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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal from the July 24, 1996, judgment of 
the district court awarding appellant Cincinnati Insurance 
Company ("CIC") attorney's fees in the amount of 
$53,429.21 and expenses of $1,417.00. CIC has appealed 
the amount of fees awarded by the district court and it 
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requests an order directing an award of its attorney's fees 
incurred on this appeal. We will vacate the judgment of the 
district court and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of CIC in the amount of $87,752.24 in 
attorney's fees and $1,417.00 in expenses heretofore 
approved. 
 
I. 
 
In 1993, appellee Ravin, Inc. was awarded a general 
contract on a construction project located in Westmoreland 
County, Pennsylvania. Ravin, Inc. contracted with a 
number of subcontractors to perform various jobs. Ravin, 
Inc. obtained from CIC a labor and materials payment 
bond, under which CIC agreed to act as Ravin Inc.'s surety 
and to make payments to the subcontractors in the event 
that Ravin, Inc. failed in its obligation to do so. In 
exchange, Ravin, Inc. and its owners, appellees Ralph and 
Darlene Murovich (collectively "Ravin"), executed an 
indemnity agreement that provided that they would 
 
exonerate, indemnify and keep indemnified [CIC] from 
and against any and all liability for losses and 
expenses of whatsoever kind or nature, including the 
fees and disbursements of counsel, and against any 
and all said losses and expense which [CIC] may 
sustain or incur: (i) by reason of having executed or 
procured the execution of any Bond or Bonds; (ii) by 
reason of the failure of [Ravin] to perform or comply 
with the covenants and conditions of this Agreement; 
or (iii) in enforcing any of the covenants and conditions 
of this Agreement. [CIC] may pay or compromise any 
claim, demand, suit, judgment or expense arising out 
of such Bond or Bonds and any such payment or 
compromise shall be binding upon [Ravin] and 
included as a liability, loss or expense covered by this 
Indemnity Agreement, provided the same was made by 
[CIC] in the reasonable belief that it was liable for the 
amount disbursed, or that such payment or compromise 
was reasonable under all of the circumstances. In the 
event of any such payment or compromise by [CIC], an 
itemized statement thereof sworn to by any 
representative of [CIC] familiar with the facts, or the 
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voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment 
or compromise shall be prima facia [sic] evidence of the 
facts and the amount of the liability of [Ravin] under 
this Agreement. 
 
App. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 
Fallon Electric Company and Corey Food Service 
Equipment, two of the subcontractors, subsequently 
brought this action against CIC in the district court. Fallon 
and Corey alleged that Ravin had failed to pay them for 
materials they had provided for the project. They asserted 
that CIC was liable for these amounts pursuant to the 
payment bond. CIC subsequently joined Ravin pursuant to 
the indemnity agreement for any losses it would incur as a 
result of the litigation, including the costs of the suit. 
Fallon and Corey then added claims against Ravin for the 
amounts they had sought from CIC. Ravin contested its 
liability to Fallon and Corey, relying on the same affirmative 
defenses raised by CIC. CIC and Ravin each retained 
separate counsel. Ravin also contested its liability under 
the indemnity agreement. Before trial the district court 
ruled that the indemnity agreement was valid and 
enforceable. 
 
CIC's counsel was present at trial but did not cross- 
examine any witnesses, relying on Ravin's counsel for that 
purpose. Before the trial was concluded, CIC and Ravin 
settled Fallon's and Corey's claims. CIC then sought 
$87,752.24 in attorney's fees and $1,417.00 in expenses 
from Ravin pursuant to the indemnity agreement, incurred 
in defending Fallon's and Corey's suit, as well as actions 
brought by several other subcontractors that were then 
pending in state court. 
 
The district court reviewed testimony from the trial in 
order to determine the amount of attorney's fees and 
expenses CIC should be awarded. At trial, CIC introduced 
testimony regarding the attorney's fees and expenses it 
incurred. Ravin conducted a short cross-examination of 
CIC's witness. See App. at 171-74. However, Ravin did not 
introduce any evidence to demonstrate that the fees were 
incurred unreasonably, in bad faith, or through fraud, or 
that CIC acted unreasonably in paying the fees. 
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On July 24, 1996, the district court awarded CIC 
expenses in the requested amount of $1,417.00. However, 
it awarded CIC attorney's fees in the amount of only 
$53,429.21, some $34,000 less than the sum requested by 
CIC. The district court concluded that the excess amount of 
attorney's fees sought by CIC was not incurred out of 
reasonable necessity. CIC appeals. Ravin has not cross- 
appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1993). Fallon, Corey, and 
Ravin are all Pennsylvania corporations with their principal 
places of business in Pennsylvania. The Muroviches are 
residents of Pennsylvania. CIC is an Ohio corporation with 
its principal place of business in Ohio. The amount in 
controversy exceeds $50,000. This Court has jurisdiction 
over the district court's final judgment pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1993). 
 
III. 
 
The parties agree that the indemnity agreement is 
governed by Pennsylvania law. CIC argues that the district 
court erred by imposing a reasonableness requirement on 
the amount of attorney's fees, especially in light of the 
"prima faci[e] evidence" language in the indemnity 
agreement. App. at 30. In addition, Ravin offers two reasons 
that the judgment of the district court should be reversed 
or modified in its favor. We will address these issues in 
turn. 
 
A. 
 
Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, in construing an 
indemnity agreement, as with any other contract, the court 
must determine the intentions of the parties. See Brotherton 
Constr. Co. v. Patterson-Emerson-Comstock, Inc., 178 A.2d 
696, 697 (Pa. 1962); Fulmer v. Duquesne Light Co., 543 
A.2d 1100, 1104 (Pa. Super. 1988). Such intentions should 
be ascertained primarily by looking to the language used in 
 
                                5 
the agreement. See Brotherton, 178 A.2d at 697; Emery v. 
Metzner, 156 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. Super. 1959). 
 
CIC argues that, in light of the "prima faci[e] evidence" 
language in the indemnity agreement, the district court 
erred in imposing on CIC the burden of proving that the 
attorney's fees it sought were incurred out of reasonable 
necessity. We agree. 
 
The district court cited cases from various jurisdictions in 
support of its conclusion that "a surety may recover fees 
and expenses under an indemnity agreement only if it was 
`reasonably necessary' for the surety to incur them . . . even 
where the contract of indemnity contains no explicit 
provision mandating reasonableness on the part of the 
surety." App. at 284 (citing United States Fidelity and Guar. 
Co. v. Love, 538 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Ark. 1976); Redfern v. 
R.E. Dailey & Co., 379 N.W.2d 451, 456-57 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1985); Perkins v. Thompson, 551 So.2d 204, 209 (Miss. 
1989); Sentry Ins. Co. v. Davison Fuel & Dock Co., 396 
N.E.2d 1071, 1074 & n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Central 
Towers Apts., Inc. v. Martin, 453 S.W.2d 789, 799 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1969); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 667, 668-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
The district court concluded "that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would adopt this well-reasoned line of 
authority." Id. at 285. It expressly placed the burden of 
proving reasonable necessity upon CIC and found that CIC 
had not sustained that burden as to a portion of the 
requested fees. See id. at 286-87. 
 
The district court was correct that several courts have 
imposed on indemnitees the burden of proving the 
reasonable necessity of attorney's fees sought pursuant to 
indemnity agreements. However, none of the cases cited 
involved indemnity agreements that contained the same 
"prima faci[e] evidence" language at issue here. See Love, 
538 S.W.2d at 558; Redfern, 379 N.W.2d at 454-55; 
Perkins, 551 So.2d at 209; Sentry, 396 N.E.2d at 1072; 
Central Towers, 453 S.W.2d at 793-94; James, 888 P.2d at 
668. 
 
Although neither the Pennsylvania courts nor we have 
ruled on the issue of the effect of such language, 1 various 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. CIC places great reliance on an unpublished opinion of this Court, 
American States Ins. Co. v. Uhutch, No. 89-3083 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 1990). 
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other courts have. The opinions of these courts 
demonstrate that the "prima facie evidence" language at 
issue here shifts to the indemnitor the burden of proving 
the fees are excessive. How the indemnitor may prove that 
the fees may not be recovered is dependent upon the 
language of the indemnity agreement. 
 
For example, in Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 
878 P.2d 314, 318 (Nev. 1994) (per curiam), the Nevada 
Supreme Court noted that the indemnity agreement there 
provided "that in any claim or suit, an itemized statement 
of expenses is prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of 
the liability of the indemnitor." The indemnitor had agreed 
to reimburse the indemnitee "for all expenses incurred in 
good faith." Id. at 316. The court held that the "good faith" 
language obviated any inquiry into the reasonableness of 
the costs incurred and required that the court consider 
"only whether the attorney's fees were incurred in good 
faith." Id. at 317. The court stated: "When the parties 
contractually agree that good faith is the standard, 
undertaking a determination of anything other than good 
faith is inappropriate." Id. The court further concluded that 
the "prima facie evidence" language shifted to the 
indemnitor the burden of proving bad faith. See id. at 318. 
 
Similarly, in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Napier 
Elec. & Constr. Co., 571 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978), the indemnity agreement provided that the 
indemnitor would be liable to the surety 
 
for all "liabilities, losses and expenses" incurred by 
[Surety], including all amounts paid by [Surety] "in 
good faith under the belief that: (1) Surety was or 
might be liable therefor; (2) Such payments were 
necessary or advisable to protect any of Surety's right 
or to avoid or lessen Surety's liability or alleged 
liability." 
 
(quoting indemnity agreement). The agreement further 
provided that "vouchers or other evidence of payments or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
However, the Court does not regard such opinions as binding precedent. 
See Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures ch. 5.8 (1994). 
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an itemized statement of payments sworn to by an officer of 
the surety shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and 
extent of the liability of the indemnitor to the surety." Id. at 
646. The court held that under such an agreement, "the 
indemnitor may successfully attack payments made by the 
surety only by pleading and proving fraud or lack of good 
faith by the surety." Id. 
 
Finally, in Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Higashi, 675 
P.2d 767, 769 (Haw. 1984), the Hawaii Supreme Court 
addressed, albeit in dictum, the situation where an 
indemnity agreement provides that payment of monies by 
an indemnitee is prima facie evidence of an indemnitor's 
liability. The court wrote: "Obviously, where such a 
provision is in the agreement, the burden of proof on th[e] 
issues [of reasonableness and good faith] shifts." Id. 
 
In addition to the courts in Nelson, Napier Electric, and 
Higashi, several courts have noted that such a "prima facie 
evidence" clause in an indemnity agreement is valid and 
enforceable. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. American Sec. 
Corp., 443 F.2d 649, 652-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bloomfield, 401 F.2d 357, 362 (6th 
Cir. 1968) (applying Tennessee law); Carroll v. National 
Surety Co., 24 F.2d 268, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1928); International 
Fidelity Ins. Co. v. United Constr., Inc., No. 91-2361, 1992 
WL 111368, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1992) (applying 
Pennsylvania law); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. 
International Fidelity Ins., No. 83-5733, 1989 WL 55388, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1989) (same); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. 
v. Boggs, 109 F.R.D. 420, 423-24 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) 
(applying West Virginia law); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. 
Melikyan, 430 So.2d 1217, 1221 (La. Ct. App. 1983). While 
these courts have declined to state the precise effect of 
such language, Ravin has not cited a single case for the 
proposition that the language has no effect whatsoever or 
that the effect of such language is anything other than that 
described in Nelson, Napier Electric, and Higashi. 
 
We conclude that the Pennsylvania courts would hold 
that a "prima facie evidence" clause in an indemnity 
agreement shifts to the indemnitor the burden of proving 
that the costs incurred were not recoverable. We further 
conclude that what an indemnitor must demonstrate to 
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escape liability for attorney's fees depends upon the precise 
language used in the agreement. In Napier Electric, 571 
S.W.2d at 646, and Nelson, 878 P.2d at 317-18, the 
Kentucky and Nevada courts held that the indemnitor must 
prove bad faith or fraud on the part of the indemnitee in 
order to avoid payment. However, this result followed from 
express language in the indemnity agreements in those 
cases providing that the indemnitees were bound only by a 
"good faith" standard. See Napier Electric, 571 S.W.2d at 
645; Nelson, 878 P.2d at 316. Here, by contrast, the 
agreement provides that Ravin would be liable to indemnify 
CIC only for those payments "made . . . in the reasonable 
belief that [CIC] was liable for the amount disbursed, or 
that such payment or compromise was reasonable under all 
of the circumstances." App. at 30 (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court should have placed on 
Ravin the burden of proving both that: CIC did not actually 
believe that it was liable for the attorney's fees disbursed, 
or that its belief in that respect was unreasonable; and CIC 
did not actually believe that the payment of such fees (as 
opposed to the incurrence of the fees) was reasonable under 
all the circumstances, or that its belief in that respect was 
unreasonable.2 A showing that CIC did not actually believe 
it was liable for the fees or that CIC did not actually believe 
that the payment of such fees was reasonable under all the 
circumstances would be tantamount to a showing of bad 
faith or fraud. 
 
The district court here expressly placed the burden on 
CIC of proving the reasonable necessity of the attorney's 
fees, and found that CIC had not met that burden. See 
App. at 286. In refusing to reallocate the burden of proof in 
accordance with the foregoing, the district court 
impermissibly ignored the terms of the indemnity 
agreement. 
 
Ordinarily, we would remand this matter for a 
determination of attorney's fees based on the proper 
standard. However, Ravin produced no evidence at trial, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We express no opinion as to what standard, if any, the Court would 
apply absent any language regarding either good faith or reasonableness 
of the incurrence or payment of the fees. 
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either directly or through cross-examination of CIC's 
witness, that would satisfy the burden it bore in 
overcoming CIC's prima facie case of entitlement. Ravin 
introduced no evidence to show either that CIC's belief that 
the payments were necessary was unreasonable, or that the 
payment of the fees was unreasonable under all the 
circumstances. That being so, Ravin's sole remaining 
grounds to challenge the attorney's fees claimed by CIC was 
bad faith, and Ravin produced no evidence, and has not 
argued on appeal, that CIC acted in bad faith. Indeed, the 
record is devoid of any indication that CIC acted in bad 
faith. In such circumstances, a remand for redetermination 
by the district court is unnecessary. See Fischer v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1541 (3d Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1247 (1997); Hanover 
Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 
1993). Therefore, we will simply vacate the judgment of the 
district court and remand with directions to enter judgment 
in favor of CIC, awarding it expenses and attorney's fees in 
the amount it requested. 
 
B. 
 
Ravin requests that we reverse or modify the judgment of 
the district court in Ravin's favor, contending that the 
district court erred in two respects. However, as we noted 
above, Ravin has conceded that it did not file a notice of 
cross-appeal pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(3). See 
Appellee's Br. at 6. Thus, we may not consider Ravin's 
contentions unless "the disposition as to [the appealing] 
party is inextricably intertwined with the interests of a non- 
appealing party so as to make it impossible to grant relief 
to one party without granting relief to the other." United 
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 344 (3d 
Cir. 1991); see also Repola v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 
938, 940-41 (3d Cir. 1992). Ravin has not provided us with 
any reason why this exception applies here and we fail to 
perceive any. Accordingly, we will not consider Ravin's 
contentions. 
 
IV. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be vacated. The 
matter will be remanded to the district court with 
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instructions to enter judgment in favor of CIC awarding it 
attorney's fees in the amount of $87,752.24 and expenses 
of $1,417.00. 
 
Costs taxed against appellees. 
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